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WAKE OF LOPEZ AND MORRISON
Andrew Kurvers Spalding*
The U.S. Supreme Court's latest plunge into the stream of commerce the-
ory of personal jurisdiction left the doctrine in a confused and confusing state.
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California,1 the Court could
not form a majority on the question of what degree of contact with a forum
state is sufficient to subject a corporate defendant to a court's jurisdiction.
Lower courts have thus been left to either selectively draw on the various opin-
ions issued in that case, or utterly ignore them and rely on prior cases. 2 The
confusion among lower courts on this issue has been accumulating for sixteen
years, and counting.
In the meantime the Court has begun a minor jurisprudential revolution in
an area of the law which, at first glance, might appear unrelated. In United
States v. Lopez3 and United States v. Morrison,4 the Court struck down acts of
Congress under the Commerce Clause' in a manner not seen since before the
New Deal.6 In doing so, the Court resurrected the core constitutional principle
of federalism and exhibited a new commitment to its protection. In the simi-
larly bold and controversial case of New York v. United States, involving the
related Tenth Amendment, the Court indicated the purpose of its new commit-
ment to protecting constitutional federalism: it is one of many constitutional
mechanisms intended to insure the protection of individual liberties.8 Thus,
among the distinct themes of the modem Court is a commitment to protecting
individual liberties by enforcing the constitutional principle of federalism.
Despite the seeming irrelevance of the Commerce Clause to establishing
personal jurisdiction in accordance with due process, the Court's commitment
to federalism suggests an answer to the question left unresolved in Asahi. At
stake in the issue of personal jurisdiction is a fundamental right recognized
* J.D., William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas (2003).
480 U.S. 102 (1987).
2 E.g., Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939 (4th Cir. 1994); Boit v. Gar-Tec
Prod., Inc., 967 F.2d 671 (1st Cir. 1992); Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941 (7th
Cir. 1992); Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1990);
Irving v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 864 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1989).
3 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
4 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6 E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating a congressional act
which set prices and labor conditions in the coal industry).
7 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
8 Id. at 181.
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since this nation's onset: government by consent. The document which lent
philosophical justification to the American Revolution - the Declaration of
Independence - was premised on the notion that a citizen may be held account-
able to a sovereign's laws only when that citizen has voluntarily consented to
its jurisdiction.9 The cases involving the stream of commerce and in personam
jurisdiction implicate this same issue: whether a corporate defendant's conduct
may be deemed sufficient to render it legitimately obligated to a forum state's
jurisdiction.' ° At stake in the personal jurisdiction issue, then, is nothing less
than the core political concept of government by consent. Because these cases
usually involve products liability law, and because products liability law is
state-based, the question becomes whether a corporate defendant's conduct
suggests that it may be held subject to the laws of a given state. In the stream
of commerce debate, the right to government by consent is thus inextricably
linked to state sovereignty.
This note will show that of the two principle opinions in Asahi discussing
the stream of commerce, only one is seriously committed to preserving the
principle of government by consent. That opinion, authored by Justice
O'Connor, protects the right of a corporate defendant to voluntarily consent to,
or to withdraw its consent from, a forum state's jurisdiction. Justice O'Connor
does this by treating each state as a distinct and sovereign jurisdiction to which
a defendant must voluntarily and purposefully offer its consent before it may be
subject to the state's laws. Thus, Justice O'Connor preserves the individual
right of government by consent through honoring constitutional federalism. "
The Court's recent commitment to protecting those individual rights safe-
guarded by constitutional federalism thus suggests, if not demands, a resolution
to the Asahi dilemma. If the Court is to be consistent in its enforcement of
constitutional federalism, it must resolve the Asahi debate in favor of Justice
O'Connor's model.
Part I of this note will discuss the foundational cases in the stream of
commerce debate, and show how the issue of government by consent is a cen-
tral, albeit unspoken, issue in those cases. Part II will explore the tension inher-
ent in the contemporary Court's treatment of the stream of commerce. Part III
will briefly outline the contours of the Court's new commitment to federalism,
and the purpose of this commitment. Part IV will conclude the note by indicat-
ing how the new federalism may be used to resolve the Asahi question.
I. THE FOUNDATIONAL CASES AND THE THEORETICAL THEMES
A. Pennoyer v. Neff and Liberal/Republican Political Thought
The fact pattern in Pennoyer v. Neff'" is familiar to every graduate of the
first year law school curriculum, and is well documented in the scholarship.' 3
I See infra text accompanying notes 41-49.
't See infra Parts I-II.
'" The alternative opinion, authored by Justice Brennan, significantly devalues both the
right to consent and state sovereignty.
12 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
13 E.g., John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REv.
1015, 1026-27 (1983).
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At a sheriffs sale, Sylvester Pennoyer purchased a piece of property in Oregon
formerly owned by Marcus Neff. 4 The land was sold to satisfy a default judg-
ment against Neff, a non-resident.' 5 In the initial action, Neff was served only
by publication.' 6 The Supreme Court ruled that the Oregon court lacked juris-
diction over Neff and his land because the land was not brought within the
authority of the court prior to the action's commencement.' 7
In justifying its ruling, the Court articulated two "well-established princi-
ples of public law respecting the jurisdiction of an independent State over per-
sons and property."18 It prefaced its discussion by noting that the States are not
fully independent sovereigns, since many of their original powers are now
vested in the government created by the Constitution. 9 However, except for
those restrictions enumerated in the Constitution, "they possess and exercise
the authority of independent States,"2 and certain principles of public law
apply. The first principle is "that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction
and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory."21 This sover-
eignty enables the authority to provide certain forms of substantive law, espe-
cially with respect to land and contract, and to prescribe the procedures for
enforcing them.22 The second principle of public law follows from the first:
"no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property
without its territory."23 Drawing on the writings of Justice Story,24 the Court
deemed "elementary" the principle that "the laws of one State have no opera-
tion outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no
tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to
subject either persons or property to its decisions. '"25
The Court claimed authority to review these state court judgments under
the Fourteenth Amendment,26 declaring that proceedings in a court which does
not have jurisdiction over the defendant violates due process of law.27 Despite
the acknowledged ambiguity of the phrase, due process must entail a proceed-
ing "according to those rules and principles which have been established in our
systems of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private
rights." 28 A valid proceeding requires "a tribunal competent by its constitu-
tion," 29 and competence includes, among other things, personal jurisdiction
over the defendant.
'" Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 716.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 735.
18 Id. at 722.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 JOSEPH STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 539 (4th ed. 1980).
25 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
26 At that time, the Fourteenth Amendment was not yet ten years old.
27 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733.
28 Id.
29 Id.
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
Pennoyer's legendary, if not infamous, status in the history of civil proce-
dure jurisprudence has evoked, if not provoked, a barrage of scholarship. The
principal issue of this controversy is the source of these two "fundamental"
principles of sovereignty, often referred to as "territorialism," and their rele-
vance to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. One group of
commentators alleges that these principles of sovereignty were imported prima-
rily from international law.30 Accordingly, such jurisprudence violates the
original purpose of the Due Process Clause. 3' The Pennoyer Court's invoca-
tion of the "eternal principles" of public law is thus an "abstract pastiche,"
which is not only devoid of meaning, but utterly unworkable in practice.3
Conversely, Pennoyer's territorialism is defended on the grounds that it has a
stronger basis than international law. Some scholars give credence to the
Court's reference to natural law, finding merit in the assertion that jurisdiction
is justified only when a state acts on persons or things within its borders.3 3
Although federalism is not explicit in the Due Process Clause, it is nonetheless
a fundamental principle of the Constitution as indicated in other clauses, and
thus may be considered in interpreting the Due Process Clause.34
According to Professor Kogan, however, this scholarship collectively suf-
fers from a failure to place Pennoyer in the proper historical and intellectual
context.35 He writes that the Pennoyer Court, in the wake of the recent ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment and post-Civil War politics, was using the
"personal jurisdiction doctrine as one important means by which federal courts
could police the states with respect to upholding the civil rights of American
citizens."" Kogan points out that, beginning with his dissent in the Slaughter-
house Cases just four years earlier, 37 Justice Field sought to develop a Four-
teenth Amendment jurisprudence rooted in a tradition of political thought
known as classical liberalism, or as manifested in this nation's history, Ameri-
can republicanism.3 8 The influence of classical liberalism in the formation of
30 E.g., Daan Braveman, Interstate Federalism and Personal Jurisdiction, 33 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 533, 544 (1982) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned only with the
defendant's rights, and not at all with federalism or state sovereignty); Drobak, supra note
13, at 1023-34 (arguing that Pennoyer borrows these notions of state sovereignty from inter-
national law and common law and integrates them into a Due Process Clause which is con-
cerned only about individual rights).
31 E.g., Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A
Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process
Clauses (Part Two), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 735, 808 (1981) (arguing the original purpose of
the Due Process Clause, requiring only that states treat all citizens equally, renders the terri-
torial component of the Pennoyer ruling irrelevant and incorrect).
32 Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal
Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 703-05 (1987).
31 E.g., id. at 693.
34 Id.
35 Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 257
(1990).
36 Id. at 298.
37 Butchers' Benevolent Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House
Co., 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing for an expansive reading of
the Fourteenth Amendment based on extra-constitutional, natural-law notions of freedom of
contract).
38 Kogan, supra note 35, at 298.
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the Constitution is well documented.39 This intellectual tradition is concerned
with limiting state power and ensuring equal rights before the law.
Professor Kogan sees the influence of John Locke, and his theories of
natural law, in Justice Field's Pennoyer opinion.4 ° Locke developed his theory
of individual rights and the role of the state by beginning with the concept of a
"state of nature," in which humans loosely associate, but no government
6xists. 4 1 Each individual enjoys her natural liberty, and seeks to preserve and
improve her life.42 The principal means of improvement is the accumulation of
personal property, which one comes to own through mixing her labor with nat-
ural materials, the results of which she is entitled to enjoy. Each person, then,
has a "natural" right to life, liberty, and property. These are natural because
they exist prior to, and regardless of, the existence of government. 43 This state
of nature becomes corrupted by human self-interest, which leads persons to
violate the natural rights of others.' This same self-interest would prevent the
harmed individual from fairly punishing the transgressor; thus is born the need
for government.4 5 All persons in the state of nature, recognizing the need for
an impartial third person to enforce natural rights, consent to the establishment
of a government. The express and limited purpose of this government is the
protection of rights.46 This government is legitimate because, and only
because, its citizens have consented to its establishment.
Locke was not so naive as to believe that all citizens explicitly consent to
their government's authority. He recognized that consent may be either express
or tacit, the latter of which is the most common. He defined at length the
meaning of tacit consent:
Every man, that hath any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of
any government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to
obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under
it; whether this his possession be of land, to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging
only for a week; or whether it be barely traveling freely on the highway; and in
effect, it reaches as far as the very being of any one within the territories of that
government.
4 7
3 One scholar writes, "[Locke] developed a set of political ideas which has very largely
served as the basis for American political values and for the institutional structure which
American and British government has since assumed. His importance for American political
thought can hardly be overestimated." D. MINAR, IDEAS AND POLITICS: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE 47 (1964) quoted in Kogan, supra note 35, at 26 (citing Donald L. Doernberg,
"We the People": John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge
Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52, 57 n.31 (1985)); see also, e.g., NATHAN TARCOV,
LOCKE'S EDUCATION FOR LIBERTY (1984); THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN
REPUBLICANISM (1988).
40 Kogan, supra note 35, at 298.
41 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 8-14 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hack-
ett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 42-52.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 64.
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By conducting oneself within the territory of a government, one enjoys
that government's protections. With this protection comes an obligation to
abide by that jurisdiction's laws. By such voluntary conduct, the subject has
tacitly consented to the government's authority, creating a social contract.
Locke argued that if this government fails to protect individual rights, it
becomes illegitimate and the people are no longer obligated to recognize its
authority.48  This is precisely the argument of The Declaration of
Independence.4 9
According to Kogan, Justice Field saw a state's assertion of personal juris-
diction as "implicating a citizen's property right of ownership and control over
one's physical self."5 Kogan cites Locke's passages in the Second Treatise in
which he discusses the right of private property: "every man has a property in
his own person.., the labor of his body and the work of his hands, we may
say, are properly his."'" Kogan considers the right to property "fundamental"
to Locke, and claims that the philosopher was concerned in his writings "not
with liberty in the abstract, but with the liberty of the freeholders. 52 Whether
Locke's theories may be reduced to an apology for property interests is debata-
ble.53 Regardless, Kogan ultimately sees the Lockean influence in Justice
Field's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence as essentially about the protec-
tion of economic rights. 54 Though his article does little to interpret the Pen-
noyer facts in light of Locke's theory of property, its role may be "self-
evident." Marcus Neff had a naturaj right to his property in Oregon. Because
Neff was not a citizen, he had not offered his tacit consent to the authority of
Oregon law. The Oregon courts could legitimately enforce Neff s obligations
under Oregon law, and thus deprive him of his natural right to that property for
failure to uphold his obligations, only after the courts has established its author-
ity over him. This authority, according to Justice Field, must be established
prior to the commencement of the action. Because the Oregon courts failed to
attach Neff's property at that time, they failed to establish personal
jurisdiction.5
48 Id. at 107-24.
41 While many may recite from memory Jefferson's invocation of self-evident truths in The
Declaration of Independence, less well-known is the second half of the same sentence,
wherein he wrote, "to pursue these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to
institute new government." THOMAS JEFFERSON, The Declaration of Independence, in THE
PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 235 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., Penguin Books 1977). Jeffer-
son is relying on Locke's social contract theory to philosophically justify the American
Revolution.
50 Id. at 300.
51 Id. at 307 (quoting J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17 (Peardon ed.,
1952)).
52 Kogan, supra note 35, at 308.
13 For a rigid and narrow Marxist interpretation of the role of property in Locke's thinking,
see, e.g., C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM (1962).
For an analysis which sees property as less determinative of Locke's politics, see, e.g., RuTH
GRANT, JOHN LOCKE'S LIBERALISM (1987).
54 Kogan, supra note 35, at 314.
55 See supra text accompanying notes 12-25.
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Kogan's Lockean analysis works wonders in advancing our understanding
of what was at stake in Pennoyer. Justice Field, rather than smuggling foreign
notions of sovereignty into the Fourteenth Amendment, 56 was actually preserv-
ing and extending the intellectual foundations of the Constitution to support its
recent addition. His undeniably novel interpretation of the Due Process Clause
was part of a greater mission, invited by the recent ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to protect the natural rights of citizens from state intrusions.
Kogan's analysis, however, may be unduly narrow. Pennoyer did involve per-
sonal property, and for that reason an analysis based on the right to property is
appropriate. But Locke's theory of consent, natural law, the social contract,
individual rights, and legitimate government was not limited to the protection
of property. Neither should Justice Field's opinion in Pennoyer be so limited.
While Kogan is correct in understanding Field's two principles of justice as
rooted in Lockean thought, those two principles should not be limited to the
protection of property.
Consider the language of Field's second principle: a state may not exercise
jurisdiction over "persons or property" outside its territory.57 Field is not limit-
ing his principle of state sovereignty to matters involving property, while con-
spicuously including matters not involving property in the statement. Neither
were Justice Story's principles so limited, as Field consistently quotes his com-
mentaries to refer to litigation involving persons or property.58 Even though
the fact pattern before the Pennoyer Court involved a proceeding in rem,
Field's principle of state sovereignty is stated so as to apply to jurisdictional
questions in all proceedings, whether in rem or not. If Field was influenced by
Locke, as Kogan rightly points out, this influence must extend beyond Locke's
theory of property.
If, as Field claims, jurisdictional questions must be answered according to
"rules and principles which have been established by our systems of jurispru-
dence, ' 59 to which principles does he refer? The answer, at least in part, must
be the principle that informs The Declaration of Independence and the Consti-
tution, not to mention Field's own jurisprudence: Lockean consent. A territory
may not extend its authority to persons outside its borders because those per-
sons have not voluntarily consented to its jurisdiction. A person may consent
through the possession of property, provided the courts attach that property. A
person may also consent tacitly, through conduct within a jurisdiction that sug-
gests she has taken on the benefits of the social contract and, in so doing,
assumes its obligations. A government's authority is not legitimate, and its
courts have no personal jurisdiction, until a citizen suggests through her own
voluntary conduct that she has entered the social contract and is thus bound by
its laws.
Pennoyer v. Neff, then, is ultimately about integrating into the Due Process
Clause a principle recognized since the American Revolution: government by
consent. While personal jurisdiction is to become substantially more complex
in subsequent cases, this principle remains central. A court does not have juris-
56 See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
17 See supra text accompanying notes 18-25.
-8 See supra text accompanying notes 18-25.
59 See supra text accompanying notes 18-25.
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diction until a person has suggested by her conduct that she tacitly consents to
its authority.
B. International Shoe and the New Deal
The Court's personal jurisdiction jurisprudence underwent only slight
modifications6" until after the Great Depression and the advent of the New
Deal. In International Shoe,6 ' a Missouri corporation had been selling shoes in
Washington state, though it maintained no offices there.62 All orders were
transmitted to the office in Missouri, and the transactions were thus completed
in that jurisdiction.6 3 When an action was brought against the corporation by
the State to collect unpaid unemployment compensation payments, the corpora-
tion alleged that its limited conduct in Washington did not constitute "pres-
ence," and thus denied the court personal jurisdiction.'
Citing Pennoyer, the Court explained that "presence" in the literal sense
was traditionally a requirement for establishing jurisdiction.65 But since the
capias ad respondum has given way to personal service of summons or other
forms of notice, due process required that the defendant have "certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"66 In explaining this latter
phrase, the Court considered the "inconveniences" which the suit would place
on the defendant.6 7 The Court recognized, however, that traditional notions of
fairness and justice cannot be reduced to a mere estimate of inconveniences. 68
Whether due process is satisfied depends on the "quality and nature of the
activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws."6 9 In
assessing this relationship, the Court invoked language which is more heavily
dependent on Pennoyer, and the intellectual climate of which it was a part, than
the Court or scholars have subsequently acknowledged. When a corporation
"exercises the privilege" of doing business in a given jurisdiction, it enjoys the
"benefits and protections of the laws of that state."7 This privilege "may give
rise to obligations," and a legal procedure which enforces these obligations can
"hardly be said to be undue."'" It is thus "reasonable and just" according to our
"traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice" to allow a state to
"enforce the obligations" which the corporation had "incurred" there through
its contacts.7 2
60 For a discussion of the intervening cases, see, e.g., Mollie A. Murphy, Personal Jurisdic-
tion and the Stream of Commerce Theory: A Reappraisal and a Revised Approach, 77 Ky.
L.J. 243, 253-64 (1989).
61 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
62 Id. at 313.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 316.
66 Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
67 Id. at 317.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 319.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 320.
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As with Pennoyer, writings on International Shoe have focused on what
are variously called federalism, state sovereignty, or territorialism concerns and
their relation to the essential purpose of the Due Process Clause. Some identify
language in the Court's opinion that suggests the Court continues to transform
the Due Process Clause into an instrument of federalism. 73 Others find the
opinion largely devoid of language which explicitly endorses the Pennoyer-era
federalism concerns, though recognizing that the ruling is completely consistent
with such principles." Still others declare that the International Shoe Court
finally freed the Due Process Clause from the shackles of territorialism.7 5
What scholars have not discussed is the prominence of the Lockean notion
of tacit consent in the Court's rationale. The Court found that the corporation's
contacts with Washington allowed them to enjoy the privileges of the state's
protection; these privileges thus gave rise to obligations. The Washington
court's exercise of authority was in accord with due process, and thus legiti-
mate, because the corporation's conduct suggested that it voluntarily consented
to the court's jurisdiction. Evidently, remaining among the "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice" is the notion that had been so influential
from the founding through the Civil War era: the liberal notion of government
by consent.
Curiously, Professor Kogan omits from his discussion of International
Shoe any consideration of the Lockean principles which, by his own account,
were integral to that case's precedent. This omission may reveal the danger of
limiting one's analysis of Pennoyer to issues of property. Because Interna-
tional Shoe does not involve a proceeding in rem, the Lockean dimension of
the ruling goes unnoticed. Kogan is nonetheless brilliant in revealing the influ-
ence of International Shoe's historical context: the New Deal. That era in
American politics, notes Kogan, redefined the relationship between the state
and the individual.7 6 Rather than simply monitoring the interaction of autono-
mous individuals, the state began assuming responsibility for the outcome of
these social processes, and thus initiated certain substantive goals for society.7 7
The state would resolve disputes not with respect to "existing boundaries or
rights," but based on the selection and implementation of substantive social
policies.7 8 Personal jurisdiction, then, became a question of centralized judicial
administration, not a question of enforcing "natural" rights or republican politi-
cal values.7 9
Kogan sees a primitive form of the New Deal conception of government in
International Shoe. The comparatively simple notions of presence and consent
that ruled the Pennoyer intellectual universe are now supplanted by "the fair
and orderly administration of the laws." 80 Such administration occurs not
73 E.g., Braveman, supra note 30, at 545-61.
7' E.g., Drobak, supra note 13, at 1039.
7' E.g., Stein, supra note 32, at 697.
76 Kogan, supra note 35, at 344.
77 Id. at 345-46.
78 Id. at 346 (quoting Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Politics of the Coase Theorem and Its
Relationship to Modern Legal Thought, 35 BuFF. L. REV. 871, 876-77 (1986)).
79 Kogan, supra note 35, at 349.
80 Id. at 355.
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through rigid enforcement of state boundaries, but by assessing the relative
"conveniences" of various forums with respect to national social policies.8' In
adopting this language, Kogan finds that the Court "entered the world of the
activist state"8" in which matters of personal jurisdiction are largely administra-
tive. The Court's jurisprudence in International Shoe "leaves the realm of sov-
ereignty and enters the realm of fair administration."8 3
In International Shoe, the dual strands of the Court's personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence begin to emerge: the liberal or republican strand that protects the
principle of government by consent by enforcing state sovereignty, and the
New Deal strand which seeks to administer national social policies by weighing
multiple factors. In subsequent cases, these strands will become both more
distinct, and more entangled.
II. THE CONTEMPORARY CONUNDRUM:
WORLD-WIDE VOLKSWAGEN AND ASAHI
A. The Dichotomy Emerges: World-Wide Volkswagen
These two strands first began to divide the Court in World-Wide Volk-
swagen v. Woodson. 84 In World-Wide Volkswagen, two New York residents
had purchased an Audi automobile in New York and then embarked on a cross-
country drive to their new residence in Arizona.85 While passing through
Oklahoma, they were seriously injured in an accident.86 The couple brought a
products-liability action in Oklahoma court, and joined as defendants the auto-
mobile manufacturer, its importer, its regional distributor (who was World-
Wide Volkswagen), and its retail dealer, Seaway.87 The latter two parties
entered special appearances, claiming that Oklahoma's exercise of personal
jurisdiction would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.8 8 World-Wide and Seaway were incorporated, and had their principal
place of business, in New York; World-Wide distributed vehicles and parts to
retailers in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. The Court had no evi-
dence that either company did any business or advertising in Oklahoma or had
an agent there.8 9
These facts became an occasion for the Court to expand its personal juris-
diction analysis. Citing International Shoe, the Court again established that the
defendant must have minimum contacts such that the suit does not offend tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice - it must be reasonable for the
suit to be brought there.90 In explaining this formula, the Court added several
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 444 U.S. 286 (1980). For a detailed account of the facts, see, e.g., Braveman, supra note
30, at 534-36; Russell J. Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of
State Courts: Time for Change, 63 OR. L. Rav. 485, 499-500 (1984).
85 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 289.
90 Id. at 292.
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factors to the analysis. While the primary concern in assessing reasonableness
is the burden on the defendant, this burden is now to be considered "in the light
of other relevant factors."'" These factors include: "the forum State's interest
in adjudicating the dispute";9 2 "the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient
and effective relief';93 "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the
most efficient resolution of controversies"; and "the shared interest of the sev-
eral States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies."9 4
This new and more complex type of factor analysis clearly takes the
Court's jurisprudence further into the realm of the administrative state
described by Professor Kogan.95 Seemingly gone is the simple and straightfor-
ward comiitment to state sovereignty. Instead, the Court has taken upon itself
the furtherance of "substantive social policies." To this end, it weighs multiple
factors involving the interests of various parties, all of which the Court
presumes itself capable of doing accurately. In its articulation of the test for
personal jurisdiction, the World-Wide Volkswagen Court would seem to have
single-handedly catapulted itself into a role as a centralized administrative
agency. The Court recognizes this change, and the concomitant relaxation of
state jurisdictional restrictions. This is justified, it asserts, by economic
changes: the "nationalization of commerce."96
"Nevertheless," the Court continues, "we have never accepted the proposi-
tion that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and
remain faithful to the principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Con-
stitution."" From this point the tenor and substance of the majority opinion
took a marked turn as the Court invoked the Pennoyer-era principle of state
sovereignty and, in seemingly greater incongruity with the times, the Framers'
intent.98 Founding-era political thought continues to govern the Court's analy-
sis as it expounds the meaning of sovereignty,9 9 all the while relying on Inter-
national Shoe. 1° ° The reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant must be assessed in "the context of our federal system of
91 Id.
92 Id. (citing McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957)).
91 Id. (citing Kulko v. Cal. Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978)).
94 Id.
95 See supra text accompanying notes 76-83.
96 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293 (quoting McGee, 355 U.S. at 223).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Whitten finds this attempt to vindicate state sovereignty as "fall[ing] entirely outside the
permissible limits of the due process clause" and is founded on a "misperception of the
Ioriginal meaning' of the Constitution." Whitten, supra note 3 1, at 838. Whitten analyzes
the Due Process Clause in a vacuum, disregarding the overall constitutional structure and
fundamental principles which must inform its interpretation.
"I0 Some find reliance on International Shoe contrived. Lewis argues that Justice White has
completely misunderstood the meaning of that precedent, wherein the "fair and orderly
administration of the laws" is only about protecting defendants from a forum that is unfair by
virtue of its distance; he argues the clause has nothing to do, in International Shoe, with state
sovereignty. Haro~d S. Lewis Jr., The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and the Curse of
Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699,
713 (1983). Lewis fails to notice that fairness includes a notion of consent, and that this
notion requires the enforcement of state boundaries.
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government."'' The constitutional principle of federalism informs due pro-
cess so as to prohibit a state's exercise of jurisdiction over an individual "with
which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations."'0 2 Herein lies the crux of
the analysis:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced
to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong
interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most
convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of
interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a
valid judgment.' 03
The reasonableness factors cannot compensate for a lack of minimum con-
tacts, and thus cannot permit a state to exercise jurisdiction when the defendant
has not availed itself of its protections. Federalism"° trumps reasonableness.
Suddenly, the Court has reverted from its New Deal judicial administration
analysis and upheld a commitment to the Lockean principle of government by
consent.'0 5 Judicial authority is illegitimate unless the defendant has, by her
own voluntary conduct, consented to its jurisdiction. 10 6 While the other factors
remain important, they simply cannot permit a court to claim authority over an
individual who has not knowingly, albeit tacitly, consented to such authority.
The remainder of the majority opinion continues along this trajectory. The
Court finds an absence of "affiliating circumstances"; that is to say, the respon-
dents "avail[ed] themselves of none of the privileges and benefits" of the
forum's law.'0 7 Such is the unmistakable language of Lockean tacit consent -
101 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1980) (quoting Int'l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)).
102 Id. at 294.
103 Id.
'o For a discussion of the federalism component, see, e.g., Drobak, supra note 13, at 1043-
44; Murphy, supra note 60, at 267. Some commentators find that World-Wide Volkswagen
is actually a far stronger endorsement of federalism than seen in precedent. See, e.g., Lewis,
supra note 100, at 713 (arguing that World-Wide Volkswagen "amplified on the sovereignty
concept"). The opinion also amplified Lewis' ire, who strongly states that the opinion's
sovereignty component enjoys "scant standing in precedent," is little more than "fanciful
orbiter dicta," and makes "no discernible decisional difference." Lewis, supra note 100, at
716. Whitten cannot see that the "purposeful activity" test bears any relation to state sover-
eignty, since it can be used to deny a state jurisdiction. It is thus, in his view, a subpart of
the inconveniences analysis. Whitten, supra note 31, at 842. This perception reflects a
failure to notice sovereignty's flip side - consent - and to appreciate the difference between
a jurisprudence rooted in the judicial administration paradigm of the New Deal and one
rooted in liberal/republican political thought. He is right, however, to point out that the
Court fails to provide a "reasoned elaboration" of why the purposeful contacts analysis
relates to state sovereignty. Id. at 843. Fortunately, that task is picked up by scholars such
as Kogan. See supra text accompanying notes 50-55.
105 See supra text accompanying note 58.
106 Drobak suggests that the Court's focus on federalism "must be seen as ultimately a
function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause"; accordingly,
it should value federalism only insofar as it protects individual liberty, and may abandon the
concept altogether if it fails to serve this purpose. Drobak, supra note 13, at 1016 (quoting
Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Campagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982)). He does
not recognize that one such liberty the Due Process Clause protects is the right to govern-
ment by consent, which cannot exist absent the continued enforcement of state boundaries.
1"7 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
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in International Shoe language, they have not incurred the obligations that
accompany the privilege of the law's protection. Countering the argument that
an automobile winding up in Oklahoma is "foreseeable," they clarify that for-
seeability is not the "mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the
forum State."' 8 Instead, it means that "the defendant's conduct and connec-
tion with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there.' 0 9 In other words, he understands that his conduct
gives rise to the obligation to abide by that particular forum's laws." 0 This
allows defendants'to choose the jurisdictions to which they are obligated - to
choose which sovereigns to whom they will offer their voluntary consent. 1 '
Then, if need be, they can sever their connection with the state 1 2 - they can
withdraw their consent. Developing the voluntariness requirement, the Court
explains that the "unilateral activity" of the plaintiff can never render the defen-
dant amenable to suit. 1 13 Hence, another party cannot subject a defendant to a
court's jurisdiction when that defendant has not voluntarily consented." 4
The majority opinion thus remains strongly rooted in the republican tradi-
tion. While never denying its authority to engage in judicial administration, it
refuses to allow such comparatively flimsy notions as "convenience" and "rea-
sonableness" to override the core principle of liberal government: consent. The
two paradigms at work in the Court's personal jurisdiction jurisprudence -
American republicanism and the New Deal - may thus be completely compati-
ble. But the majority in World-Wide Volkswagen refused to let the New Deal
factors demolish bedrock constitutional theory. The New Deal factors may
complement liberal theory, but cannot supplant it.
108 Id. at 295-96.
109 Id. at 297.
110 Whitten again fails to see the principle of tacit consent, which is itself tacit, in the pur-
poseful activity test. He claims that the Court's application of this test in World-Wide Volk-
swagen is "keyed to a physical, subjective type of territorial activity by the defendant,"
which ignores the "practical inquiry" into the reasonableness of suit. Whitten, supra note
3 1, at 849. The Court does not focus exclusively on the "practical" aspects because it recog-
nizes a principle at stake that no practicalities can trump: tacit consent. Again, Professor
Whitten's analysis is oblivious to any intellectual influence which might precede the New
Deal.
I I I Stein is unique among commentators in recognizing this dimension to the Court's juris-
prudence, noting that the Court requires a "consensual arrangement between the defendant
and the forum state." Stein, supra note 32, at 722.
112 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
1'3 Id. at 298 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
114 Professor Braveman recognizes the consent element here, and offers two objections.
Braveman, supra note 30, at 543-53. First, he cannot see that the exercise of jurisdiction
actually intrudes on the sovereignty of a sister state, since oftentimes multiple states have an
interest in a single lawsuit; if each refrained from exercising jurisdiction when the interests
of another were implicated, no state could ever proceed with a suit. Id. Second, he suggests
that the concern for harmonizing the interests of multiple states is entirely distinct from
protecting the rights of defendants. Id. The first objection is irrelevant, since the fact that
multiple states may have an interest in a given lawsuit has no bearing on the question of
whether the defendant has consented to the jurisdiction of the forum state. The second
objection fails to see the necessary interdependence of consent and state sovereignty in a
federalist system. Because each state is a distinct jurisdiction, protecting the right to consent
to any of them necessitates recognizing state boundaries for jurisdictional purposes.
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The same may not be said for Justice Brennan, whose dissent presumed a
very different relationship between New Deal administration and traditional
state sovereignty. The majority's emphasis on the defendant's contacts, in
Brennan's view, accords too little weight to the other reasonableness factors,
specifically the forum State's interest and the inconvenience to the defen-
dant.11 5 Brennan does not seek to abolish the purposefulness requirement
entirely. Instead, he argues that an automobile dealer does indeed intend that
his product will be used to travel to distant states. In selling the product, the
dealer does "purposefully inject the vehicle into the stream of interstate com-
merce."' 6 While this argument may appear to preserve the principle of con-
sent, consider the ramifications. In selling an automobile, the dealer thereby
consents to every jurisdiction to which the vehicle may be driven. As a result,
the mere sale of a single automobile is the immediate and automatic act of
consent to jurisdiction in every court in the United States. If that consent is to
be informed, and if the dealer is to structure his conduct so as to comply with
the laws of every jurisdiction to which he has just consented, he must know and
accommodate the laws of all fifty states. Should he wish to withdraw his con-
sent from one state, he must withdraw it from all. Consequently, Justice Bren-
nan's notion of consent is so broad that it becomes meaningless. Under
Brennan's analysis, consent ceases to be a voluntary act made toward a particu-
lar jurisdiction.
Justice Brennan's lack of concern for the principle of consent becomes
more apparent in his consideration of the New Deal factors. Though he
acknowledges, as did the majority, that the economy has changed dramatically
since the ruling in International Shoe, he finds that these changes carry very
different implications. Given the "tremendous mobility of goods and people,"
he writes, "I do not think that the defendant should be in complete control of
the geographical stretch of his amenability to suit."'' 7 A defendant should be
held to answer for a products liability suit in any jurisdiction, regardless of
whether he brings his products there deliberately, or his products reach the
jurisdiction through the unilateral act of another. "Jurisdiction," he boldly
announces, "is no longer premised on the notion that nonresident defendants
have somehow impliedly consented to suit."' 8 Brennan's basis for this claim
in the Court's precedent is unclear, given the Court's consistent use of the mini-
mum contacts test. It would seem that Brennan is suggesting that jurisdiction
should not be based on implied consent. Indeed, he may want to go much
further; as he writes in the Court's earlier personal jurisdiction cases, "notions
of state sovereignty were impractical and exaggerated.""' 9 This far exceeds the
oft-repeated notion that the modem national economy renders state sovereignty
impractical; in Justice Brennan's view, it was always impractical. In ultimate
testimony to his belief that the New Deal has completely extirpated the Ameri-
"' World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299-300 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Bren-
nan is concerned not with theoretical principles that apply to the defendant, but with the
defendant's "actual inconvenience"; see Murphy, supra note 60, at 270.
16 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 306 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
l'7 Id. at 311.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 312.
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can liberal/republican notion of consent, he writes, "I cannot see how a defen-
dant's right to due process is violated if the defendant suffers no
inconvenience." 12 0
Justice Brennan's desire to abandon tacit consent could not be more une-
quivocal, and his principled disagreement with the majority could not be more
pronounced. He seeks not to qualify, but to completely abandon the dual prin-
ciples of consent and state sovereignty in due process jurisprudence. Rather
than grafting the new theory of judicial administration onto traditional princi-
ples of liberal/republican political thought, he wants to supplant them. Thus
two distinct camps emerge within the Supreme Court on the issue of personal
jurisdiction. The majority, relying on the minimum contacts test, believes that
the New Deal reasonableness factors are properly applied only when at least
some voluntary act on the part of the defendant establishes contacts with the
forum. This camp relies principally on traditional liberal political thought,
though it concedes that the new economy may necessitate a degree of central-
ized judicial administration. Justice Brennan, as the flag-bearer of the dissident
camp, seeks to abandon the outmoded notions of government by consent and its
American corollary, federalism. Instead, he envisions a Supreme Court which
assesses the relative weight of various factors to determine which forum would
most further the substantive social policies the Court has elected to enforce.
These two camps will bring the Court, and the law, to loggerheads in the near
future.
B. The Court at a Theoretical Impasse: Asahi.
The Court's most recent foray into personal jurisdiction left it in a quag-
mire from which it has not, in sixteen years, attempted to escape. In Asahi
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 2 ' a California motorcyclist
was injured in an accident that he alleged was due to a defective rear tire. 122
He brought suit against several defendants, including Cheng Shin, the
Taiwainese manufacturer of the tire tube.' 23 Cheng Shin in turn filed a third
party claim for indemnification against Asahi, the Japanese manufacturer of the
valve assembly in the tire tube.'2 4 Cheng Shin then settled with the injured
motorcyclist, leaving only its suit against Asahi. 125 Asahi moved to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction1 26 claiming they conducted no business activity of any kind
in California.' 27 Asahi sold valves to Cheng Shin knowing they would be sold
in California, but did not engage in any deliberate conduct of its own in Cali-
fornia. 128 Approximately one percent of Asahi's sales were to Cheng Shin, and
approximately twenty percent of Cheng Shin's sales were in California; thus
120 Id. at 309.
121 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
122 Id. at 105-06.
123 Id. at 106.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
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about one fifth of one percent of Asahi's products were sold in the jurisdiction
where suit was brought.
129
The Court ultimately agreed that the reasonableness factors applied to
these circumstances could not justify a lawsuit in California.' 3 ° However, on
the issue of whether Asahi established minimum contacts with California, no
opinion commanded a majority. Instead, four justices signed on to each of two
opinions. One was authored by Justice O'Connor, the other by Justice Bren-
nan. The split can.also be characterized as a theoretical impasse which paral-
lels the majority/dissent dichotomy in World-Wide Volkswagen: one opinion is
strongly committed to the principle of tacit consent and federalism, while the
other dilutes these concepts beyond recognition in the furtherance of substan-
tive social policies.
Justice O'Connor's opinion begins by invoking what she considers the
"constitutional touchstone" of the personal jurisdiction analysis: voluntary con-
duct directed toward the forum. 3 ' The Due Process Clause requires that a
defendant "purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."' 13 2 As discussed
above,' 3 3 this is the language of tacit consent. Further clarifying the word
formula and buttressing its commitment to consent, Justice O'Connor specifies
that it must be "actions by the defendant himself that create a 'substantial con-
nection' with the forum State."' 34 Citing World-Wide Volkswagen, O'Connor
reaffirmed that a consumer's unilateral act of bringing the product into the
forum state is an insufficient constitutional basis for establishing personal juris-
diction.'3 5 Applied to the facts, the O'Connor plurality' 36 found that Asahi
never engaged in any act "purposefully directed" toward California; mere
awareness that their product will wind up there did not establish voluntary, tacit
consent. 137
129 Id. For a more detailed account of the facts, see Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Mini-
mum Contacts: Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 39 S.C. L. REV. 729, 783-87
(1988).
130 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114.
'3' Id. at 108-09 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
132 Id.
133 See supra text accompanying note 59.
134 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 108-09 (quoting Burger King , 471 U.S. at 474).
135 Id.
136 Morton alleges that the result in Asahi serves to "weaken the link" between the mini-
mum contacts analysis and asserting jurisdiction, since a majority agreed that even where
minimum contacts are established, the reasonableness factors may still undermine jurisdic-
tion. Bruce N. Morton, Contacts, Fairness and State Interests: Personal Jurisdiction after
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 9 PACE L. REV. 451, 490 (1989).
One might also say that the holding strengthens the role of minimum contacts, because
although these justices did not find contacts sufficient, they agreed that they were necessary.
'' Id. Stravitz points out that the O'Connor opinion, read literally, suggests that a foreign
part manufacturer could not be sued in a jurisdiction where its product was "systematically
and continuously distributed with its knowledge and acquiescence" as long as the manufac-
turer did not engage in "consumer oriented activity" in that jurisdiction. The holding permits
manufacturers to escape liability by "insulating the manufacturing process from the distribu-
tion process." Stravitz, supra note 128, at 790. Accord Kim Dayton, Personal Jurisdiction
and the Stream of Commerce, 7 REV. LITIG. 239, 271 (1988). This may be true, and is a
serious objection. However, the costs of ameliorating this problem through Justice Bren-
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This analysis is expressly rejected by Justice Brennan, who believes that
the stream of commerce refers to "the regular and anticipated flow of products
from manufacture to distribution to retail sale."' 3 8 Thus, as long as the manu-
facturer is aware that the product "is being marketed" in the forum State, a
lawsuit is not surprising. 139 Notice the passive form of the verb. Besides pro-
voking the ire of legal writing professors (and few others), it demonstrates the
theory of personal jurisdiction that Brennan expounded in World-Wide Volk-
swagen. 40 The conduct of another party may be sufficient to subject a defen-
dant to jurisdiction if that conduct is reasonably anticipated. Since jurisdiction
for Justice Brennan is not founded on consent, and notions of federalism and
state sovereignty have always been exaggerated and impractical, whether the
defendant has knowingly and purposefully engaged in conduct directed to that
forum is irrelevant.
Unlike World-Wide Volkswagen, however, Justice Brennan's reasoning
has ceased to be a mere dissent. Now, the two camps of personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence have achieved positions of rough equality. Neither commands a
majority. Whether the Court will remain committed to the core republican
principle of government by consent, or instead, will allow the New Deal to
completely extirpate that intellectual tradition, is a question not yet answered.
Or at least, to find an answer, one must look beyond the personal jurisdiction
cases.
III. IN SEARCH OF A GUIDING PRINCIPLE: THE COURT'S NEW FEDERALISM
Since Asahi, a new paradigm of constitutional interpretation has
emerged.' 4 ' In the three watershed cases of United States v. Lopez, 142 United
States v. Morrison, 143 and New York v. United States, 144 the Court began to
articulate a new commitment to constitutional federalism. Lopez involved a
now-famous high school student convicted of violating the Gun-Free School
Zones Act.' 4 5 Passed by Congress in 1990, the Act made the possession of a
nan's jurisprudence may not be fully appreciated by Stravitz, who does not recognize the
principles of liberal political thought at stake in the history of personal jurisdiction jurispru-
dence. One would hope that a solution could be devised which would prevent manufacturers
from escaping liability but which did not destroy the foundation of our constitutional
scheme.
138 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139 Id.
140 See supra text accompanying notes 115-20.
141 For a discussion of the historical development of federalism in the judiciary, see Law-
rence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 125; see
also Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment? Lopez and Constitutional Theory,
46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 845 (1996) (considering whether Lopez constitutes a "constitu-
tional moment" of the sort described by Bruce Ackerman). Calabresi insists that the federal-
ism concerns implicated in Lopez are of a significance equal to the more glamorous
individual rights cases. Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated
Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752 (1995).
142 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
143 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
'44 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
145 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
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firearm in a school zone a federal offense. 146 As in the personal jurisdiction
cases,' 4 7 the Court acknowledged the economic changes which necessitated the
modem expansion of federal authority,148 and cited the post-New Deal cases in
which the Court broadened Congress' commerce powers. 4 9 But in an apparent
attempt to temper the otherwise radical appearance of its imminent holding, the
Court claimed that even these cases acknowledged the "outer limits" of con-
gressional authority to regulate interstate commerce. 15o It then articulated these
limits, producing the three-prong test for the Interstate Commerce Clause.
First, citing United States v. Darby, 151 and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States,152 Congress may regulate the "use of the channels of interstate
commerce."' 5 3 Second, citing the Shreveport Rate Cases154 and Perez v.
United States, 155 Congress may "regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce," even if the
threat is intrastate in origin. 56 Finally, citing Jones & Laughlin,' 57 activity
may be regulated when it "substantially affects" interstate commerce. 158 Find-
ing that the prohibition of guns in school zones is neither a channel nor an
instrument of interstate commerce, the Court expounds the substantially affects
test.' 5 9 Though past cases, such as Wickard,160 permitted the aggregation of
activities that do not separately have a substantial effect, the Court explains that
aggregation may only occur where the activity is economic in nature. 161 The
Gun-Free School Zones Act is a criminal statute that makes no reference to any
sort of economic activity, 162 and thus the effect of bringing guns near schools
cannot be aggregated for purposes of a commerce analysis. 163 The Court notes
that congressional findings pertaining to the economic impact of such conduct,
while not normally required, would assist the Court in its analysis; however,
146 Id.
147 See supra Part I.
148 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556.
149 Id.
150 Id. For a thorough discussion of the relation of Lopez to precedent, see Russell F. Pan-
nier, Lopez and Federalism, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 71 (1996).
151 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding a congressional act that prohibited the shipment in inter-
state commerce of lumber that was manufactured in violation of labor laws).
152 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that prohib-
ited racial discrimination in hotels that served patrons in interstate travel).
113 United States. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
114 Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (upholding an
order of the Interstate Commerce Commission that prohibited charging different rates for
different train shipment routes).
155 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding a provision of the Consumer Credit Protection Act
which regulated credit transactions).
156 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
157 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (permitting the NLRB to
prohibit the termination of steelworkers' employment for labor activity).
158 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
159 Id. at 559.
16 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
161 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
162 For an analysis of Lopez's effect on other areas of congressional regulation, see Julian
Epstein, Evolving Spheres of Federalism After U.S. v. Lopez and Other Cases, 34 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 525 (1997).
163 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
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they were not provided. '" Thus, for the first time in sixty years, 16 5 the Court
struck down an act of Congress for exceeding the limits of the Interstate Com-
merce Clause. 166
The Court begins to illuminate the policy considerations behind this hold-
ing by citing precedent; and in a seemingly further effort to maintain a faqade
of continuity with precedent, it again cites the early New Deal case of Jones &
Laughlin. Congress' Commerce Clause authority must always be considered
"in the light of our dual system of government."' 67 The danger of neglecting
this core constitutional element of federalism, according to the Court, is that an
unbounded Commerce Clause jurisprudence will eventually "obliterate the dis-
tinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely
centralized government."' 6 8 Thus the Lopez Court resurrected constitutional
principles that its Commerce Clause jurisprudence had neglected, in practice if
not in rhetoric, since the New Deal: federalism and state sovereignty. 169 The
Court's opinion, though, is surprisingly devoid of an explanation of why it has
elected to bring back these concepts into its jurisprudence. Why is federalism
important? What is lost by "obliterating" the national/local distinction? Ulti-
mately, what is at stake? These questions are not answered in Lopez.
Suspicions that the Lopez holding would be little more than a curious
aberration were assuaged by the Court's controversial decision striking down
the Violence Against Women Act, United States v. Morrison.170 That Act pro-
vided a civil cause of action for victims of violent acts motivated by gender. 71
A female college student brought suit under the Act against two fellow students
for an alleged rape.' 72 She won, and the male students appealed, arguing that
the Act exceeded congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. 173 The
Court invoked the three-prong Lopez test, and, paralleling that case, analyzed
the instant facts under the third prong: the substantial affects test.' 7 4 In further
16 Id. at 562-63. For a focused examination of this component of Lopez, see Barry Fried-
man, Legislative Findings and Judicial Signals: A Positive Political Reading of United
States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 757 (1996).
165 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
"6 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568. Several scholars argue that such radical decisions regarding the
scope of congressional authority ought to be left to the political process. See, e.g., Lino A.
Graglia, United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 719 (1996); Tom Stacy, What's Wrong with Lopez, 44 U. KAN. L. REv. 243 (1996).
167 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
168 Id. For an argument that this distinction, in practice, is utterly illusory, see Stephen M.
McJohn, The Impact of United States v. Lopez: The New Hybrid Commerce Clause, 34 DUQ.
L. REv. 1 (1995). Alternatively, others hold on to the distinction, but suggest that the
Court's use of it in Lopez is confused. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After
United States v. Lopez, 38 A~iz. L. REv. 793 (1996).
169 For an enthusiastic defense of the states' role that Lopez carves out, see Gregory W.
O'Reilly & Robert Drizin, United States v. Lopez: Reinvigorating the Federal Balance by
Maintaining the States' Role as the "Immediate and Visible Guardians" of Security, 22 J.
LEGIS. 1 (1996).
170 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
171 Id. at 601-02.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 609.
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similarity with that precedent,' 7 5 the Court found arguments that violence
against women is a commercial or economic activity unpersuasive. Congress
had attempted to meet the Court's Lopez requirements by providing express
findings of the economic effects of gender-motivated violence, including the
deterrent effects on interstate travel and business, diminished national produc-
tivity, and increased medical costs.' 7 6 If such arguments were taken seriously,
wrote the Court, Congress would be able to regulate other, more common
forms of criminal conduct, the economic consequences of which would be far
greater.177 The Court found this line of reasoning to be a slippery slope, ulti-
mately encroaching on "other areas of traditional state regulation."'' 78 It thus
exceeded Lopez's degree of congressional scrutiny by actually disregarding
congressional findings. 1
79
The logic of those findings - that noneconomic or noncommercial activi-
ties may be aggregated - was rejected by the Court in Lopez, and was again
rejected in Morrison.'8 0 That logic invoked the policy concern that now seems
fundamental to a Commerce Clause analysis: the obliteration of the national/
local distinction! 8 In buttressing this policy, the Court here invoked the
Framers' intent, finding that it "can think of no better example of the police
power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the
States, than the suppression of violent crime and the vindication of its vic-
tims. ' ' 18' Again, the Court is bringing the principles of federalism and state
sovereignty back to the fore. But as in Lopez, the Morrison Court does not
explain why these principles have again become paramount.
For an explanation of the purposes which federalism serves, one may look
to cases addressing that clause, which is the flip side of the enumerated powers:
the Tenth Amendment.18 3 New York v. United States 84 involved a congres-
sional act which provided a series of incentives to states to comply with nuclear
waste disposal requirements. 8 5 These incentives were of three types: one
involved monetary incentives administered by the Secretary of Energy; another
involved the denial of future access to disposal facilities; and the third required
the states to take title to all improperly disposed waste, thereby becoming liable
175 For an argument that the use of Lopez demonstrates the ambiguity of that holding, and
the inevitable confusion it will generate, see Sara E. Kropf, The Failure of United States v.
Lopez: Analyzing the Violence Against Women Act, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD.
373 (1999); see also Glenn H. Reynolds, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, Or What if the
Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 Wis. L. REV.
369 (examining lower courts' usage of Lopez).
176 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994)).
177 Id. at 615.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 617.
'8l Id. at 618.
182 Id.
183 For an analysis of New York in connection with Lopez, see Anthony B. Ching, Traveling
Down the Unsteady Path: United States v. Lopez, New York v. United States, and the Tenth
Amendment, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 99 (1995).
184 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
185 Id. at 150-52.
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for all associated damages. ' 8 6 While the first two passed constitutional muster,
the third raised a federalism concern. It provided states the "choice" between
regulating the waste disposal according to congressionally mandated standards,
or becoming legally liable for undisposed waste.18 7 Either action would effec-
tively "commandeer" states into federal service, crossing the line between
encouragement and coercion.1 88 The Constitution gives Congress the power to
regulate individuals, not states. 189 A state may not be compelled to comply
with federal regulations; it must be given an alternative that is not itself another
form of regulatory coercion.' 90 So stringent is this constitutional prohibition
that a state's officials may not even consent to such a practice.'91
As in the modem commerce cases, the Court is here resurrecting the prin-
ciples of federalism and state sovereignty. The Court advances our understand-
ing of federalism beyond those cases, however, by offering a more
sophisticated analysis of the underlying policies. In explaining why a congres-
sionally imposed standard can violate a state's constitutional protections even
when that state's officials have consented, the Court writes that the answer
"follows from an understanding of the fundamental purpose served by our Gov-
ernment's federal structure." '192 This fundamental purpose is precisely what the
Lopez and Morrison opinions failed to provide. States are not protected for
their own sake; that is, the Court makes the somewhat shocking claim that
federalism and state sovereignty are not ends in and of themselves, but serve a
more fundamental purpose. That purpose is the protection of individuals: "fed-
eralism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sover-
eign power."' 93 Federalism is thus another constitutional mechanism designed
to protect individual rights. For this reason, states "cannot consent to the
enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in the Consti-
tution. '"'9 4 The Constitution does not protect the states' right to consent; it
protects the citizens' right to consent.
The Court explains that the purpose of federalism is the protection of indi-
vidual rights. While federalism is obviously not the only mechanism for the
protection of individual rights, there are rights that cannot be protected without
a strong commitment to preserving state sovereignty in our federalist
scheme. 195 One such right, in the view of the author, is the right to freely
consent to the authority of a state government and thus be obligated to its
jurisdiction.
186 Id. at 152-54.
187 Id. at 175.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 178.
190 Id. at 176.
191 Id. at 181.
192 Id.
193 Id. (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
194 Id. at 182.
115 For an in-depth analysis of the relationship between federalism and individual liberties,
see Calabresi, supra note 141.
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IV. CONCLUSION: INTEGRATING THE NEW FEDERALISM INTO THE
PERSONAL JURISDICTION DOCTRINE
As in New York, the stream of commerce issue in personal jurisdiction
implicates a right which can only be protected through the recognition of state
sovereignty. Thus, the policy concerns articulated in that case, and in the
related Commerce Clause cases, apply with equal force to personal jurisdiction.
Among the liberties which "derive from the diffusion of sovereign power" 19 6
and are thus protected by the enforcement of federalism principles is the right
to consent. This founding-era principle guided the earliest personal jurisdiction
cases, 197 and remains influential in Justice O'Connor's opinion in Asahi.
19 8
The Supreme Court is now resurrecting such founding-era principles by pro-
tecting "traditional areas of state regulation"' 99 and once again calling our
attention to the ways these principles remain foundational in constitutional
law. 2" The "dual system of government"' '1 that traditionally guided personal
jurisdiction cases202 has, in the Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment
cases, again taken center stage as a necessary mechanism for the protection of
core constitutional rights.
Of the two opinions in Asahi, only Justice O'Connor's is consistent with
the Court's new focus on federalism and the distinct rights that federalism pro-
tects. Her emphasis on purposeful availment, which requires an action of the
actual defendant in or directly toward the forum state, 03 is uniquely consistent
with the new federalism in two ways. First, it upholds the distinct jurisdiction
of each state. An act of injecting a product into the economy is not, automati-
cally and simultaneously, an act directed toward each and every state. States
are respected as independent and co-equal jurisdictions with the authority to
write and enforce their own law. Products liability is a "traditional area of state
regulation, ' ' 4 and Justice O'Connor's Asahi opinion protects this area in the
same way, and for the same reasons, that such areas were protected in Lopez
and Morrison. Secondly, in recognizing the distinct jurisdiction of each state,
Justice O'Connor's opinion also protects the right of a defendant to voluntarily
consent to, or withdraw its consent from, any given state. Thus, her opinion
does not uphold federalism for its own sake; rather, it does so in order to pro-
tect a right long valued by our intellectual traditions and institutional
practices.10 5
By contrast, Justice Brennan's Asahi opinion does precisely what the
Lopez Court feared would result from an unbounded Commerce Clause juris-
196 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
197 See supra Part I.
198 See supra text accompanying notes 130-36.
199 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000).
200 See supra Part III.
201 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
202 See supra Part I.
203 See supra text accompanying notes 130-36.
204 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
205 See supra Part II.
[Vol. 4:141
Fall 2003] IN THE STREAM OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 163
prudence: "obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local
and create a completely centralized government. 2 °6 Denouncing notions of
state sovereignty as "impractical and exaggerated, 20 7 Brennan would have a
manufacturer who injects a product into the economy be subjected to an undif-
ferentiated national jurisdiction. This is curious, given that products liability is
state law. But worse, Brennan's disregard for the diffusion of power between
the states and the federal government, and thus of the truly local character of
products liability law, deprives a defendant of the right to consent. Regrettably,
the most favorable explanation is that Justice Brennan simply does not value
this core principle of American political thought and practice. At worst, how-
ever, he does not even recognize its relevance to the controversy. For, by his
own admission, he "cannot see how a defendant's right to due process is vio-
lated if the defendant suffers no inconvenience. 20 8
Valuing state sovereignty and the right to consent by no means requires an
abandonment of the other factors used to determine a suitable forum. The con-
venience of the parties, the state's interests, and other considerations can
remain in the analysis, since they may reflect the reality of a national economy
and the Court's modified role in an administrative state. But, as the majority in
World-Wide Volkswagen took pains to emphasize, the Due Process Clause
may, at times, necessarily deprive a state of jurisdiction "even if' 2 9 the other
criteria are met. This result may follow from the foundational concept in
American liberal/republican political thought that government is not legitimate
unless a citizen has voluntarily, albeit tacitly, consented to its jurisdiction.
In personal jurisdiction, as in its Commerce Clause cases, the Court must
not be oblivious to the vast economic changes that have occurred since the
founding; its jurisprudence must not disregard these plain social facts. But
when the inevitable day arrives, and the Asahi issue is finally confronted, we
would be wise to note what may be the most fundamental lesson of the Court's
new federalism: when economic circumstances collide with core constitutional
principles, in a legitimate regime, the constitutional principles must prevail.
206 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37).
207 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 312 (1980).
208 Id. at 309.
209 Id. at 294.
